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Abstract 
 
Knowledge Management (KM) has been recognized as a critical management strategy in 
generating competitive advantage for the organization. In order to protect organizational 
knowledge stored in or transferred through company’s Knowledge Management Systems 
(KMS), information security controls have to be incorporated into these systems. However, 
overly strict controls may adversely impact the perceived usefulness of the system and 
consequently its usability. This research examines the impact of security measures on 
perceived usefulness of KMS. More specifically, we investigated the impact of security 
training, security policy and technology on the perceived usefulness of KMS. Security 
self-efficacy, perceived personal responsibility, content quality, and perceived ease of use 
were included as mediating factors. The proposed research model was tested empirically 
through a survey of 51 IT professionals working at a large public university who are 
currently using a secure knowledge repository. Results show that security training impacts 
perceived personal responsibility directly and through security self-efficacy of the user. KMS 
security level affects perceived ease of use both directly and through content quality of the 
system. As expected, perceived personal responsibility and perceived ease of use impact 
perceived usefulness of the KMS. The theoretical and practical implications of the findings 
are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Knowledge management (KM) has been recognized as a critical management strategy in 
generating competitive advantage for the organization (Grant, 1996). Information technology 
is recognized as an important enabler for the implementation of KM initiatives (Alavi & 
Leidner, 2001). The class of information technologies that support and enhance the various 
KM processes is known as Knowledge Management Systems (KMS) (Alavi & Leidner, 
2001).  
 
KMS Technology Technical Security Solution 
KMS Supporting Technology: 
• Database, Repository 
• BBS, Forum, Groupware 
 
Access Control (Authentication, Authorization) 
Encryption, Issue Specific Policies 
KMS Platform Technology: 
• Intranet 
 
Firewall, SSH, VPN, IDS, Issue Specific Policies 
Table 1. Technical Security Solutions for KMS 
 
The advent of modern web technology has enhanced the capability of KMS by allowing 
larger amounts of knowledge resources to be made available to organizational employees. 
However, the greater availability of online knowledge has also increased the likelihood of its 
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unauthorized access and abuse by both employees and outsiders. Previous research (Gold et. 
al, 2001; Liebeskind, 1996) highlights that only upon securing its valuable knowledge assets 
can the organization sustain the competitive advantage created by them. Thus, in order to 
guard KMS from security threats, various security technologies have been incorporated into 
these systems. Table 1 shows various security technologies that could be used to guard KMS. 
The term secured knowledge management systems (secured KMS) refers to those KMS that 
are under the protection of such security mechanisms (Thuraisingham, 2004). However, 
security technologies such as firewalls and anti-virus software alone are insufficient to 
manage the security challenges of the Internet age (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). As 
humans are often an inherent source of security threats and vulnerabilities, security policies 
that specify acceptable and unacceptable actions in using these systems are necessary 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2003).  
 
Though added security mechanisms (policies and technology) could provide better protection 
for knowledge assets in the organization, if applied inappropriately, they may be restrictive in 
nature and conflict with the open sharing culture required to promote KM initiatives 
(Liebeskind, 1996). Motivated by these concerns which has not been addressed by previous 
literature, the purpose of this study is to identify and understand the security related factors 
that influence users’ perception of the usefulness of secured KMS. Such an understanding 
may lead to organizational interventions or technology design considerations which can 
promote usage of secured KMS and thereby enhance the effectiveness of the organization’s 
KM strategy (Gray 2000). 
 
2. Literature Review 
Past KMS studies have identified various factors that might affect users’ perception of KMS 
usefulness. These include the output quality of the KMS, effort of using KMS, an 
individual’s KMS experience, and social norms (Liaw & Huang, 2003; Kankanhalli, 2002). 
However, the impact of security mechanisms on KMS usefulness has not been considered. 
The information security and organizational behavior literature are reviewed to investigate 
the possible impacts.  
 
Information security is defined as the protection of information and systems that use, store 
and transmit that information (NSTISS, 1994). The purpose of information security is to 
protect the three characteristics of information, namely confidentiality, integrity and 
availability, through both technical solutions and managerial actions (NSTISS, 1994). Some 
previous literature (e.g., Whitman and Mattord 2003) has suggested that the increase in 
system security strength would protect the content quality and overall quality of the system 
perceived by users. On the other hand, other studies (e.g., Johansson 2001) pointed out that 
high security strength could reduce the usability of the information system. For example, 
Nelson (2003) showed that high security strength might hinder users in their work if it denies 
them access to resources or services they need. Such an impact of security measures on the 
convenience of using a system might affect users’ perception of usefulness of the overall 
system.  
 
Past information security and organizational behavior literature has also shed light on the 
individual characteristics that might affect the user acceptance of and resistance to security 
measures and secured information systems. Frank et al. (1991) showed that perceived 
personal responsibility, informal norms, personal computer (PC) knowledge, and PC 
experience might have an impact on the security related behaviors of PC users in an 
organization. Other studies (Adams and Sasse 1999) found that users’ understanding of 
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security issues and awareness of security threats greatly affect their perception of the 
usefulness of security mechanisms and the overall secured system. Based on the above 
literature and concepts, we have developed a research model that relates system security 
measures (level and training), system characteristics (content quality) and individual factors 
(security self-efficacy and perceived personal responsibility) to the acceptance of secured 
KMS. 
 
3. Research Model and Hypotheses 
Figure 1 presents the research model and hypotheses of this study. We propose that KMS 
security level impacts perceived ease of use of secured KMS both directly and mediated 
through content quality. Security Training/Awareness Effort is expected to impact perceived 
personal responsibility both directly and through security self-efficacy. In turn, perceived 
ease of use and perceived personal responsibility are proposed to influence perceived 
usefulness of the secured KMS.  
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed Research Model 
 
KMS Security Level refers to the clarity, comprehensiveness, and intensity of the security 
controls implemented in the secured KMS. Both technical security solutions implemented 
and security policies imposed on the system are part of the security controls (Whitman & 
Mattord, 2003). Perceived ease of use refers to “the degree to which a person believes that 
using a particular system would be free of effort” (Davis 1989). A broader view of ease of 
use includes elements such as ease of learning, ease of control, and understandability (Davis 
1989). Strict policies imposed on the system restrict users from accessing the content when 
needed (Nelson, 2003). Security technologies such as complex authentication models and 
encryption methods using concepts unknown to users also make the system difficult to 
understand and to use (Johansson, 2001). Therefore, we posit that, 
 
H1. KMS security level is negatively related to the perceived ease of use of the secured KMS. 
 
On the other hand, by protecting the integrity, availability and confidentiality of the content 
in the system, security controls could help to preserve the overall content quality of the 
system (Whitman & Mattord, 2003). Content quality is a major determinant of overall IS 
quality (Liaw & Huang, 2003), which has a positive effect on individual’s perceived ease of 
use of information systems. Hence, we hypothesize, 
 
Perceived Usefulness of 
Secured KMS 
Perceived Ease of Use 
of Secured KMS 
 
Content Quality 
 
KMS Security Level 
• Technology 
• Policy 
Perceived Personal 
Responsibility 
 Security Self-efficacy 
 
Security Training/Awareness 
Effort 
 
H4 H1 
H3 
H2 
H8 
H7 
H5 
H6 
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H2. KMS security level is positively related to the content quality of the secured KMS. 
H3. Content quality is positively related to the perceived ease of use of the secured KMS. 
 
Perceived usefulness is defined as “the degree to which a person believes that using a 
particular system would enhance his or her job performance” (Davis, 1989). The less effort 
needed to use a system, the more it may be used to increase job performance. Effort saved 
due to improved ease of use may be redeployed, enabling a person to accomplish more work 
for the same effort (Davis, 1989). Thus, we expect that, 
 
H4. Perceived ease of use is positively related to the perceived usefulness of the secured KMS. 
 
Security Training/Awareness Effort refers to the organization’s effort in building in-depth 
security knowledge and improving understanding of the security needs of its employees 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2003; Adam & Sasse, 1999). Users’ perceived personal responsibility 
for the results of their actions is a form of psychological contract which is defined as 
“expectations about the reciprocal obligations that compose an employee-organization 
exchange relationship” (Morrison & Robinson, 1997). Previous research showed that 
organizational effort in providing security training and awareness programs could help users 
of the system better understand the purpose for security and recognize their respective 
responsibilities in safeguarding the security of the system (Adam & Sasse, 1999). Therefore, 
we hypothesize, 
  
H5. Security Training/Awareness Effort is positively related to user’s perceived personal responsibility. 
 
Moreover, studies (Compeau and Higgins 1995) have shown that support from the 
organization could increase individuals’ judgment of self-efficacy. We refer to self-efficacy 
with respect to the secured use of the secure system as security self-efficacy. The 
organizational effort of providing training and awareness programs to employees is expected 
to improve their judgment and their ability (Bandura, 1982) in using the system in a secured 
manner. Also, people with strong self-efficacy beliefs in performing certain tasks will be 
more committed to the tasks and more likely to take responsibility for their actions (Staples et. 
al., 1998). Therefore, we posit, 
 
H6. Security Training/Awareness Effort is positively related to security self-efficacy. 
H7. Security self-efficacy is positively related to perceived personal responsibility. 
 
Previous studies (Morrison and Robinson 1997) indicate that individuals would seek to assign 
responsibility when they are faced with unknown situations in performing a task. This 
process results in the assignment and recognition of responsibility. Once users recognize their 
responsibilities in using a secured KMS, their perceptions regarding the usefulness of the 
technology will be favorably enhanced (Ozag & Duguma, 2004). This leads us to the 
following hypothesis, 
 
H8. Perceived personal responsibility is positively related to the perceived usefulness of the secured KMS. 
 
4.  Research Methodology 
The survey research method was adopted to collect data for testing our theoretical model. A 
step-by-step process recommended by Churchill (1979) was used to develop the survey 
instrument.  
4.1 Construct Operationalization 
Where available, constructs have been measured using tested items from prior studies to 
enhance validity. Where this was not possible, we generated new items based on a review of 
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past literature. KMS security level (KMSL) was measured using items (self-developed and 
from Straub 1990) for technology aspects (KMST) and policy aspects (KMSP). KMST 
assessed access control, authentication, firewall, and encryption levels. KMSP measured 
clarity, comprehensiveness, and accessibility of policies and enforcement of penalties. 
Security training and awareness effort (STAE) measured the effectiveness of security training 
programs in the organization and their frequency (based on Martins & Eloff 2001). Content 
quality (CTQL) assessed the accuracy, reliability, and timeliness, of content (from 
Kankanhalli 2002) as well as belief in the integrity of the content (from Whitman and 
Mattord 2003). Perceived personal responsibility (PPRP) was measured as the understanding 
of roles and responsibilities related to use of secured KMS. Security self-efficacy (SSEF) 
items were modified from computer self-efficacy items (Compeau & Higgins 1995) to suit 
the security context. Perceived ease of use (PEOU) and perceived usefulness (PUFN) of the 
secured KMS were assessed using standard measures from Venkatesh (2000), Venkatesh & 
Davis (2000), and Rai et al. (2002). Two items for STAE were frequency measures based on 
a six-point scale ranging from 0 ("Never Before") to 5 ("less than once in 6 months"). The 
rest of the items were measured using the 7-point Likert scale. Table 2 gives the items for the 
constructs after validation. 
 
KMS Security Level (Policy) 
KMSP1 There are clearly written rules and procedures guiding the use of secured knowledge 
management system. 
KMSP2 There are comprehensive written rules and procedures guiding the use of secured knowledge 
management system. 
KMSP3 There are too many rules and procedures guiding the use of secured knowledge management 
system. 
KMSP4 There is strict enforcement of written rules and procedures. 
KMSP5 The penalties for misuse of the secured knowledge management system are severe enough. 
KMSP6 The information security policies are readily available for reference. 
KMS Security Level (Technology) 
KMST1 The level of access control for the secured knowledge management system is fine-grained. 
KMST2 The authentication level for the secured knowledge management system is high. 
KMST3 The security setting level of the firewall securing the secured knowledge management system 
is high. 
KMST4 The encryption strength of the encryption algorithm used by the secured knowledge 
management system is high. 
Security Training and Awareness 
STAE1 My organization holds information security awareness program. 
[] Weekly [] Monthly [] Quarterly[] Half yearly [] Less than once in 6 months [] Never Before 
STAE2 My organization sends me for information security training. 
[] Weekly [] Monthly [] Quarterly[] Half yearly [] Less than once in 6 months [] Never Before 
STAE3 My organization ensures that I am aware of information security relating to the use of the 
secured knowledge management system. 
STAE4 My organization educates me about the concept of information security of the secured 
knowledge management system. 
STAE5 My organization gives me specific training about the information security procedures which I 
need to follow when using the secured knowledge management system. 
Content Quality 
CTQL1 The secured knowledge management system provides me with reliable knowledge that I need. 
CTQL2 The secured knowledge management system provides me with timely knowledge that I need. 
CTQL3 The secured knowledge management system provides me with accurate knowledge that I need  
CTQL4 I am confident that the knowledge in the secured knowledge management system is kept 
secure. 
CTQL5 I am confident that the knowledge in the secured knowledge management system cannot be 
illegally modified. 
CTQL6 I am confident that the knowledge in the secured knowledge management system will be 
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available when I require it. 
CTQL7 I believe that knowledge in the secured knowledge management system is always in its 
original state, and hence can be trusted. 
Perceived Personal Responsibility 
PPRP1 I understand the consequences of circumventing security practices of the secured knowledge 
management system. 
PPRP2 I understand that user’s level of responsibility for the security of the secured knowledge 
management system. 
PPRP3 If I discover suspicious/unusual occurrences happening on the secured knowledge 
management system, I will report it to the security personnel. 
PPRP4 I feel that I need to comply with all the security practices guarding the secured knowledge 
management system when I am using the system. 
Security Self Efficacy 
SSEF1 I know what knowledge should be kept confidential. 
SSEF2 I know what knowledge should be kept confidential. if there was someone giving me step by 
step instructions. 
SSEF3 I know what knowledge should be kept confidential if there was no one to tell me what to do. 
SSEF4 I know what knowledge should be kept confidential if I have seen someone using it before 
 I know what knowledge should be kept confidential if I have a copy of written procedures and 
rules to refer to 
Perceived Ease of Use 
PEOU1 Interacting with the secured knowledge management system does not require a lot of my 
mental effort. 
PEOU2 It is not laborious to comply with the security mechanisms when I am using the system. 
PEOU3 The security mechanisms do not impede my access to the knowledge I want from the system. 
PEOU4 It is easy to understand the interaction requirements of the system and any messages generated 
by the system. 
PEOU5 I find it is easy to get the secured knowledge management system to do what I want it to do. 
Perceived Usefulness 
PUFN1 Using secured knowledge management system improves my job performance 
PUFN2 Using secured knowledge management system enhances my effectiveness on the job 
PUFN3 I find that the secured knowledge management system is useful to my job. 
PUFN4 The secured knowledge management system makes my job easier to accomplish. 
Table 2. Constructs and Items 
 
4.2 Survey Administration 
The 50 item survey was administered to 68 IT professionals working in the IT departments of 
a large public university. Out of these distributed questionnaires, 51 were returned, resulting 
in a total response rate of 75%. All chosen respondents are users of a KMS called 
“Developer’s Corner”, which is used to store and exchange software system development 
related knowledge within the IT departments of the university. Role-based access control is 
implemented in guarding the system, and the system is strictly open only to the developers 
within the departments. A cover letter explaining the significance of the study and assuring 
the confidentiality of responses was included with the survey instrument. All the respondents 
were volunteers. Nevertheless, they were given a token payment for their participation.  
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Gender   
Male 35 68.6% 
Female 16 31.4% 
Age   
21-29 13 25.5% 
30-34 26 51.0% 
35-39 6 11.8% 
40-50 6 11.8% 
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Education   
Diploma 1 2.0% 
Bachelor 28 54.9% 
Master 21 41.2% 
Doctorate 1 2.0% 
Working Experience    
0-3 3 5.9% 
3-6 12 23.5% 
6-9 15 29.4% 
9-12 13 25.5% 
12-15 4 7.8% 
>=15 4 7.8% 
Table 3. Profile of Respondents 
 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 delineates the profile of the respondents. The majority of the respondents are male 
(68.6%), aged between 30 and 34 (51%) and have either a Bachelor or Master degree (96.1%). 
Over 94% of the respondents have at least 3 years of working experience. 
 
5. Data Analysis 
Partial Least Squares (PLS) analysis, a Structure Equation Modeling (SEM) technique, was 
employed to assess our model. PLS evaluates the measurement model (relationships between 
items and constructs) within the context of the structural model (relationships among 
constructs) (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). This technique does not require multivariate normal 
distribution or large sample sizes for its data. In addition, it is able to handle both formative 
and reflective manifest variables jointly occurring in one structural model (Falk & Miller, 
1992). In the current study, KMS security level is a formative construct as it consists of 
several dimensions and the indicators of each dimension are measures that form or cause the 
creation or change in the construct (Bollen, 1984). Besides, given that the sample size for this 
study is relatively small, PLS is appropriate for this study. PLS-Graph version 3.0 was used 
in data analysis to assess the measurement and structural models.  
 
Constructs and Items Item Weights Constructs and Items Item Weights 
KMS Security Level KMS Security Level 
KMSP1 0.43*** KMST1 0.31** 
KMSP2 -0.18* KMST2 0.08 
KMSP3 -0.60*** KMST3 0.47*** 
KMSP4 0.35*** KMST4 0.07 
KMSP5 0.10 
KMSP6 -0.22* 
* Indicates item is significant at p < 0.05 level; 
** p < 0.01 level; *** p < 0.001 level 
Table 4.  Item Weights for KMS Security Level 
 
5.1 Evaluation of Measurement Model 
The measurement model consists of relationships between the constructs and the items used 
to measure them. Its strength is demonstrated through convergent and discriminant validity 
(Hair et. al, 1998). It should be noted that reflective and formative constructs need to be 
treated differently during the evaluation. Examination of correlations or internal consistency 
among the measuring items of formative constructs is irrelevant (Mathieson et al., 1996). 
However, the absolute value of the items weights for formative constructs will be examined 
instead. The evaluation of formative constructs and reflective constructs will be separately 
discussed in the following sections.  
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Formative Construct 
There is one formative construct in this study, the KMS Security Level. The item weights are 
examined to identify the relevance and level of contribution of the items to this construct. 
From Table 4, we can see that KMSP3 and KMST3 contribute most to the KMS Security 
Level. This suggests that users of the system consider that the KMS security level is mainly 
determined by the number of rules and procedures guiding the use of the system and the 
strength of firewalls imposed on the system.  
 
 
Table 5.Convergent Validity for Reflective Constructs 
 
Reflective Constructs 
The rest of the constructs, other than the KMS Security Level, are reflective constructs. 
Convergent validity is assessed for these constructs by testing a) item reliability, b) 
Cronbach’s Alpha and c) average variance extracted (AVE) by each construct (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981). As shown in Table 5, all 29 items have loadings on their respective constructs 
Constructs 
and Items 
Item 
Reliability 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE) 
Security Training and 
Awareness Effort 
0.85  0.64 
STAE1 0.64  0.87  
STAE2 0.67  0.85  
STAE3 0.91  0.79  
STAE4 0.91  0.78  
STAE5 0.82  0.81  
Content Quality 0.94  0.73 
CTQL1 0.89  0.93  
CTQL2 0.90  0.92  
CTQL3 0.85  0.93  
CTQL4 0.81  0.93  
CTQL5 0.79  0.94  
CTQL6 0.84  0.93  
CTQL7 0.90  0.92  
Perceived Personal 
Responsibility 
0.91  0.78 
PPRP1 0.93  0.86  
PPRP2 0.91  0.86  
PPRP3 0.90  0.87  
PPRP4 0.79  0.92  
Security Self Efficacy 0.82  0.56 
SSEF1 0.83  0.86  
SSEF2 0.62  0.72  
SSEF3 0.89  0.72  
SSEF4 0.59  0.75  
Perceived Ease of Use 0.87  0.67 
PEOU1 0.65  0.88  
PEOU2 0.89  0.82  
PEOU3 0.86  0.84  
PEOU4 0.80  0.85  
PEOU5 0.87  0.83  
Perceived Usefulness 0.96  0.90 
PUFN1 0.95  0.95  
PUFN2 0.96  0.95  
PUFN3 0.95  0.95  
PUFN4 0.94  0.96  
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greater than 0.50, and 24 out of 29 items have a loading above 0.78. This indicates that these 
items have sufficient item reliability (Barclay et al., 1995). All constructs have Cronbach’s 
Alpha values of 0.70 and above, indicating adequate internal consistency (Nunnally, 1978). 
All AVE are well above 0.5 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Hence all reflective constructs of our 
model showed adequate convergent validity. 
 
 
Discriminant validity of the reflective constructs can be assessed by two ways: a) examine 
factor loadings, and b) examine item correlations (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). In our study, 
six factors were extracted from factor analysis using principal components (Table 6). All item 
loadings on stipulated constructs are greater than the required 0.5 (Hair et. al., 1998) and all 
eigenvalues are well above one, indicating that the construct is stable and items anchor well  
 
All the non-diagonal entries in Table 7 are smaller than the six diagonal entries of the specific 
constructs, indicating that measures of the constructs correlate more highly with their own 
items than with items measuring other constructs in the model. Thus, we conclude that 
discriminant validity of the scales is adequate in this study.  
 
 STAE CTQL PPRP SSEF PEOU PUFN 
Component Constructs Items 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STAE1 -0.18 0.01 0.24 0.61 0.12 0.29 
STAE2 -0.23 0.17 0.12 0.69 0.14 0.18 
STAE3 0.32 0.13 0.25 0.80 0.03 -0.06 
STAE4 0.34 -0.02 0.19 0.85 0.03 -0.01 
Security Training/ 
Awareness Effort  
(STAE) 
STAE5 0.29 0.21 -0.01 0.81 -0.01 0.01 
CTQL1 0.80 0.27 0.04 0.22 0.22 0.20 
CTQL2 0.79 0.25 0.15 0.16 0.05 0.22 
CTQL3 0.82 0.08 0.10 0.11 -0.09 0.21 
CTQL4 0.74 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.20 0.20 
CTQL5 0.74 0.13 0.21 0.04 0.15 0.01 
CTQL6 0.85 0.13 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.17 
Content Quality 
(CTQL) 
CTQL7 0.86 0.04 0.16 0.14 0.08 0.10 
PPRP1 0.08 0.24 0.88 0.20 0.04 0.10 
PPRP2 0.06 0.21 0.86 0.21 0.08 0.13 
PPRP3 0.22 0.23 0.81 0.14 -0.02 0.17 
Perceived 
Personal 
Responsibility 
(PPR) PPRP4 0.40 0.14 0.66 0.11 0.06 0.16 
SSEF1 0.26 0.15 0.31 0.12 0.51 0.14 
SSEF2 -0.04 0.06 -0.06 -0.07 0.91 0.02 
SSEF3 0.17 0.04 0.18 0.25 0.79 0.10 
Security Self 
Efficacy  
(SSEF) 
SSEF4 0.06 0.14 -0.07 0.02 0.88 -0.07 
PEOU1 0.23 0.05 0.29 0.05 0.06 0.69 
PEOU2 0.30 0.43 0.08 0.20 -0.02 0.68 
PEOU3 0.44 0.40 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.56 
PEOU4 0.43 0.21 0.31 0.24 0.04 0.55 
Perceived Ease  
of Use 
(PEOU) 
PEOU5 0.44 0.47 0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.60 
PUFN1 0.12 0.89 0.21 0.14 0.13 0.12 
PUFN2 0.15 0.89 0.19 0.13 0.04 0.15 
PUFN3 0.27 0.82 0.26 0.16 0.17 0.17 
Perceived 
Usefulness 
(PUFN) 
PUFN4 0.20 0.88 0.21 0.06 0.11 0.18 
Eigenvalue 6.07 4.14 3.41 3.35 2.72 2.45 
Variance (%) 20.93 14.29 11.75 11.54 9.37 8.45 
Cumulative Variance (%) 20.93 35.21 46.97 58.51 67.88 76.34 
Table 6. Factor Loadings for Reflective Constructs 
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STAE 0.64      
CTQL 0.12? 0.73     
PPRP 0.20? 0.16? 0.78    
SSEF 0.13? 0.15? 0.14 ? 0.56   
PEOU 0.12? 0.45? 0.26 ? 0.13 ? 0.67  
PUFN 0.11? 0.20? 0.26 ? 0.13 ? 0.40 0.90 
Table 7. AVE vs. Squares of Correlations among Constructs 
 
5.2 Evaluation of Structural Model 
Given an adequate measurement model, the hypotheses could be tested by examining the 
structural model. The result of structural model analysis for the proposed model is presented 
in Figure 2. The predictive and explanatory power of the model is assessed first based on the 
amount of variance in the endogenous constructs for which the model could account. Our 
model explained 25% of the variance in perceived personal responsibility, 55% of the 
variance in perceived ease of use, and 44% of the variance in perceived usefulness of the 
secured KMS. As the threshold for adequate explanatory power is 10% (Falk and Miller, 
1992), we consider our model possesses sound predictive validity. 
 
 
Figure 2. Path Diagram 
 
Hypothesis Path Coefficient T-value P-value Outcome 
H1: KMSL to PEOU 0.38 2.80 0.01 Not Supported 
H2: KMSL to CTQL 0.57 7.04 0.001 Supported 
H3: CTQL to PEOU 0.45 3.24 0.01 Supported 
H4: PEOU to PUFN 0.50 3.57 0.001 Supported 
H5: STAE to PPRP 0.36 2.54 0.01 Supported 
H6: STAE to SSEF 0.36 2.48 0.01 Supported 
H7: SSEF to PPRP 0.25 1.92 0.05 Supported 
H8: PPRP to PUFN 0.25 2.09 0.05 Supported 
Table 7. Hypotheses Testing Results 
After computing parameter estimates for all paths in the structural model, bootstrap 
resampling method was employed to compute T-values for all paths (Table 7). Given that 
each hypothesis corresponded to a path in the structural model, support for each hypothesis 
could be determined based on the sign (positive or negative) and statistical significance for its 
corresponding path. As shown in Table 7, H2, H3, H4, H5, H6, H7, and H8 are supported at 
Perceived Ease of Use 
of Secured KMS 
(PEOU) 
 
Content Quality 
 
KMS Security Level 
• Technology 
• Policy  
Perceived Personal 
Responsibility (PPRP) 
 Security Self-efficacy  
 
Security 
Training/Awareness Effort 
H4, 0.50*** 
H1, 0.38** 
H3, 0.45** 
H2, 0.57*** 
H8, 0.25* H7, 0.25* 
H5, 0.36** 
H6, 0.36** 
R2 = 0.55 
R2 = 0.25 
R2 = 0.13 
R2 = 0.44 
*Significant at p<0.05;  
** Significant at p<0.01; 
***Significant at p<0.001 
Perceived Usefulness of 
Secured KMS 
R2 = 0.33 
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the significance level of 0.05 while H1 is not supported (significant but in the opposite 
direction hypothesized). 
 
6. Discussion and Implications 
This research addresses the impact of security related factors on individual cognitive 
reactions to the secured KMS. Consistent with many other system acceptance studies, 
perceived ease of use has been shown to be an important determinant of the perceived 
usefulness of the secured KMS. As expected, KMS security level impacts perceived ease of 
use both directly and through the content quality produced by the KMS. This result suggests 
that the usefulness of the KMS can be enhanced by increasing content quality and perceived 
ease of use. Users of the KMS are concerned with the quality of knowledge they obtain from 
the system. Hence, security mechanisms (e.g. file hashing, access control and encryption) that 
are used to protect knowledge integrity, availability, and confidentiality will be welcomed by 
users.   
 
Besides, our results also indicate that individuals with high security self-efficacy beliefs and 
good understanding of their security responsibilities (perceived personal responsibility) tend 
to have a more positive perception of the usefulness of the secured KMS. We also found that 
organizational effort in building security training and awareness programs is effective in 
developing such individual characteristics. This finding suggests that for the effective 
protection of KMS, merely introducing strong security measures is not enough. People feel 
the secure systems are useful when they fully understand the purpose of security and their 
own roles in securing the KMS. Organizations could provide training and awareness 
programs to promote an individual’s understanding and awareness.  
 
Surprisingly, the hypothesized negative impact of KMS security level on perceived ease of 
use of the system was not supported. Though trade-offs between security measures and 
system usability have been examined and evaluated in previous studies (Johansson, 2001; 
Nelson, 2003; Phelps & Mok, 1999), our result showed that end users of the system might 
perceive such trade-offs differently. Similar to several other studies (Chadwick et. al. 2002; 
Whitman & Mattord 2003) we found that security strength enhances perceived ease of use. In 
sight into this phenomenon is revealed from Chadwick et al’s study (2002). Their interviews 
with users of the system reveal that once users had gained access to the system, no-one 
thought the security software was an imposition, as they did not feel its existence after they 
had successfully logged on. This shows that added security does not impose a further burden 
on users of the system, if it appears to be transparent to users. Moreover, all respondents in 
our study are IT professionals who have an understanding of the security mechanisms behind 
the system. Hence, the strength of security mechanisms did not affect their perceptions 
towards KMS. This finding suggests that in order to minimize the trade-offs between 
usability and security of the system, security mechanisms should be designed so that they are 
as transparent to users as possible.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In this study, we proposed a research model that attempts to explain the impact of security 
related factors on the user’s perception of usefulness of secured KMS. The research model is 
tested empirically through survey questionnaires administered with current users of a secured 
KMS. Results indicated that security related individual characteristics, such as security 
self-efficacy and perceived personal responsibility, have a significant effect on the perceived 
usefulness of the system. Organizational effort in holding security training and awareness 
program could help the users of the system to build up such individual characteristics. The 
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study also found that high security strength imposed on the system has a positive impact on 
users’ perceived ease of use of the system, both directly and indirectly through the 
improvement in the content quality of the system. The perceived ease of use of the system 
affected the individual perception of system usefulness.  
 
It is important to note that these results should be interpreted in light of the study’s limitations. 
A larger sample size can be used in future studies to improve the statistical power of the 
results. Moreover, respondents in this study are all IT professionals with technical expertise, 
so attempts to generalize the results to other contexts must be done cautiously. In moving 
forward, the research model could be evaluated with subjects of different IT expertise in the 
future. 
 
This study has made an initial attempt to investigate how security measures imposed on the 
KMS affect users’ perception towards the usefulness of the system. Future research could 
further extend our study to investigate the impact of security measures on the overall usage 
pattern of the secured KMS. Besides, this research focuses only on the effect of security 
related factors. These factors were able to account for 44% of the variance in perceived 
usefulness. Future research could include other possible antecedents of KMS usage such as 
trust and pro-sharing norms. It will be interesting to study how these factors interrelate to the 
factors of this study in determining users’ perceptions on the secured KMS.  
 
As more organizational knowledge resources are made available online through KMS, this 
increases both benefits and threats to organizations. Security measures are required to protect 
the knowledge assets within. However, just the presence of such mechanisms does not 
guarantee KMS effectiveness. By understanding the impact of these mechanisms on 
individual’s perceptions towards KMS, organizations can learn how to make the mechanisms 
more effective.  
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